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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents brought this action seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act, 
Utah Code Ann., §§ 34-20a-l et seq. (Supp. 1975), is 
unconstitutional* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Respondents1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Appellants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment* 
NATURE OF RELIEF'SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
order granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denying Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In the alternative, Appellants seek reversal of 
the lower court's ruling that the collective bargaining and 
compulsory arbitration provisions of the Utah Firefighters 
Negotiations Act are not severable; and reversal of the 
lower court's order insofar as it holds that the collec-
tive bargaining provisions of the Utah Firefighters Negotia-
tions Act are unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act, Utah 
Code Ann., §§ 34-20a-l et seq. (Supp. 1975) (hereinafter 
-1-
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sometimes referred to as the Act) , was passed by Utah's 
41st Legislature in its general session and became the law 
of this State on or about May 13, 1975. 
The Act's most controversial sections provide 
that certain Utah municipalities have a duty to engage in 
good faith collective bargaining with local firefighter 
bargaining representatives; and that if a bargaining impasse 
is reached, "all unresolved issues shall be submitted to 
arbitration." The Act establishes a procedure for the 
selection of an arbitration board and: "The determination 
of the majority of the board of arbitration thus estab-
lished shall be final and binding on all matters in dispute 
except in salary and wage matters which shall be considered 
advisory only." 
Refusing to comply with the Act's mandates, 
Respondent municipalities (hereinafter referred to as Plain-
tiffs) brought the present action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the Act is unconstitutional. The lower court 
ruled in its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the collective bargaining and compulsory 
arbitration provisions of the Act were non-severable; and 
that the Act as a whole was an unconstitutional delegation 
of the legislative powers of Utah's municipalities. Appellants 
(hereinafter referred to as Defendants) contend that these 
two specific and exclusive rulings are in error. 
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ARGUMENT I 
NEITHER FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
NOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING DISPUTES CONSTITUTE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS AND, 
THEREFORE, THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI §28. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Utah Firefighters 
Negotiations Act runs afoul of Utah Constitution, Article 
VI § 28 which provides that: 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, 
any power to make,, supervise, or interfere with 
any municipal improvement, money, property, or 
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to 
levy taxes, and to select a capitol site, or to 
perform any municipal functions. 
-Plaintiffs1 contention here assumes that firefighter/ 
city collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration of 
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes are "municipal 
functions" within the meaning of Article VI § 28. However, 
this Court1s past interpretation of Article VI § 28fs "municipal 
function" language reveals that this assumption is unjustified. 
The test for ascertaining what is or is not a "municipal 
function" was most recently set forth by this Court in Tribe v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). Tribe upheld 
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act against an Article VI 
§ 28 constitutional attack and noted that the Development Act's 
-3-
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constitutionality hinged on "whether [its] objects and 
purposes ... are state-wide or local." 
If the legislative enactment authorizes the 
performance of activities, which qualify as 
a function appropriately performed by a state 
agency, the constitutional interdiction of 
Article VI, Section 28, is not applicable. 
This section applies only to municipal functions 
... . The problem of "urban blight" we 
recognize as one of state-wide concern, and not 
merely a local or municipal problem. (Emphasis 
in original.) Id. at 50 3. 
Applying the Tribe analysis to the present case—Defendants 
suggest that there are six specific reasons why firefighter/ 
city labor relations are a matter of State-wide and not 
merely local concern. 
(1) Presumption of Constitutionality. Utah 
Supreme Court decisions unanimously support a presumption 
of constitutionality for State legislative enactments: 
In determining constitutionality, statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional until the contrary 
is clearly shown. It is only when statutes 
manifestly infringe upon some constitutional 
provision that they can be declared void. Every 
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and 
every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 
53, 62, 140 P.2d 939, 943 (1943). 
See also, Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2 — 
Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 184 (1969). 
Thus it should be kept in mind that Plaintiffs carry a 
heavy burden of proof in their attempt to establish the 
constitutional infirmity of the Act. 
(2) Constitutional Policy. Utah Constitution, 
Article XVI § 8 states that: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Legislature may, by appropriate legislation . .. 
provide for the comfort, safety, and general welfare 
of any and all employees• No provision of this 
Constitution shall be construed as a limitation 
upon the authority of the Legislature to confer 
upon any commission now or hereafter created such 
power and authority as the Legislature may deem 
requisite to carry out the provisions of this 
section. 
If this constitutional provision does not entirely vitiate 
Plaintiffs1 "special commission—municipal function" argument, 
it is at least persuasive authority for the proposition that 
labor relations are a matter of State-wide and not merely 
local concern. This conclusion is reinforced by Utah Consti-
tution , Article XVI § lfs declaration that: "The rights of 
labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to 
promote the indistrial welfare of the state." Consonant 
with this policy declaration, this Court has noted that State 
minimum wage legislation for public works employees "was 
passed for the benefit of labor and the protection of society 
in general ... ." Burr v. Childs, 265 P.2d 383, 386 (Utah 1953). 
Likewise, Plaintiffs would not dispute the assertion 
that establishing working hours is an integral part of labor 
relations; and yet Utah Constitution, Article XVI §§ 6 and 7 
specifically provide that: "Eight hours shall constitute a 
day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or aided 
by the state, county, or municipal governments ..." and that 
the State Legislature shall enforce this constitutional 
directive by appropriate legislation. 
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With power to control so many important labor rela-
tions problems constitutionally vested in our State Legis-
lature, it is difficult to conclude that firefighter/city 
collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/ 
city collective bargaining disputes are municipal functions. 
(3) Constitutional Power. Whether collective 
bargaining and compulsory arbitration in the context of fire-
fighter/city labor relations are "municipal functions" can be 
determined in part by reference to those "powers" conferred on 
cities by Utah Constitution, Atticle XI § 5. 
Utah Constitution, Article XI § 5 provides in 
pertinent part that cities are to be created by general laws. 
These laws may, in turn, be legislatively altered, amended, or, 
repealed. Cities created pursuant to Article XI § 5 are 
authorized to "exercise all powers relating to municipal 
affairs, and to adopt and enforce within [their] limits local 
police, sanitary, and similar regulations" only to the extent 
that the exercise of such powers and the adoption and enforce-
ment of such regulations is "not in conflict with the general 
law" as enacted by the State Legislature. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Express limitation of these municipal powers and, therefore, 
of municipal functions, is obvious in Article XI § 5fs further 
stipulation that "this grant of authority shall not ... be deemed 
to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature in matters 
relating to State affairs, to enact general laws applicable 
alike to all cities of the state." 
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This "not in conflict" language has been construed 
by this Court most recently in Allgood v, Larson, 545 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1976). The Court there laid down certain basic 
principles relative to the issue of State v. municipal powers 
and functions. 
In Nasfell v. Ogden City, this Court stated 
that it was committed to the principle that 
cities have none of the elements of sovereignty 
and that any fair, reasonable, substantial 
doubt concerning the existence of the power is 
resolved by the Court against the corporation 
(city) and the power denied; grants of power 
to cities are strictly construed to the 
exclusion of implied powers which are not 
reasonably necessary in carrying out the 
purposes of the express powers granted .... 
The State may always invade the field of 
regulation delegated to the cities and supersede, 
annul, or enlarge the regulation which the 
municipality has attempted. It may modify 
or recall the police power of the city as it may 
abolish the city itself. Id. at 531 and 532. 
According to Allgood, the unmistakable import of Article 
XI § 5 is'that cities are creatures of the State Legislature; 
that as such their powers are limited to powers expressly 
or impliedly conferred by State legislative enactment; and 
that powers expressly or by implication granted to cities 
do not limit the State Legislature's constitutional authority 
to enact laws with respect to State affairs generally. See 
also, Lark v. White,head; 28 Utah 2d 343, 502 P.2d 557 (1972); 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Ogden City, 26 
Utah 2d 190, 487 P.2d 849 (1971); and State v. Salt Lake City, 
21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968). 
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In a public employer/employee labor relations context, 
this subordination of municipal to State policy-making power 
is illustrated by the case of Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 8 P.2d 
591 (Utah 1932). There, Salt Lake City had attempted to 
negotiate contracts for the construction of certain public 
improvements. These contracts contained restrictive covenants 
which were designed to ameliorate local unemployment problems 
and which required contractors to pay laborers a fixed minimum 
wage and to give preferential hiring treatment to local residents. 
The Court ruled that the city was without authority to make these 
covenants and that such covenants were, therefore, illegal and 
void. 
The power to fix a minimum wage and to prescribe 
the hours that shall constitute a day's labor are 
quite generally regarded as an exercise of the police 
power. [Citations omitted.] This power is inherent 
in the State. "A municipal corporation has no inherent 
power to enact police regulations, but derives it 
solely from the Legislature, and consequently can 
exercise only such police power as is fairly included 
in the grant of powers by its charter." [Citation 
omitted.] Id. at 594. 
The Court also invalidated Salt Lake City's preferential hiring 
policy—not only because the city had no independent authority 
to entertain such a policy, but also because the State had 
enacted a law which ordered municipalities to give preferential 
hiring treatment to "citizens of the United States, or those 
having declared their intention of becoming citizens." The Court 
held that this State enactment of policy superceded contrary 
municipal employment practices. Id. at 595. 
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Consistent with Article XI § 5, Allgood, and the 
Bohn Court's delimitation of "municipal powers" and by analogy 
"municipal functions," Utah's State Legislature has granted 
cities only a qualified power to organize and regulate fire 
departments. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-55 (1953) provides that: 
"They [cities] may, except as otherwise provided by law, 
provide for the organization and support of a fire depart-
ment ... ." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Therefore, to the extent the Utah Firefighters 
Negotiations Act is the general law of the State, cities do 
not have authority to regulate their fire departments in 
contravention of said Act. If*this authority is lacking, 
it cannot be said that compulsory arbitration of collective 
bargaining disputes between firefighters and cities is a 
"municipal function." A municipality cannot be forced to 
unconstitutionally delegate a power which it does not possess. 
(4) Case Law. Case law also supports Defendants1 
argument that firefighter/city collective bargaining and com-
pulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining 
disputes are State affairs and, therefore, not municipal 
functions. 
For example, in Midwest City v. Cravens, 532 P.2d 
829 (Okl. 1975), a municipality objected to a firefighters1 
and policemenfs arbitration law on the ground that "a classi-
fication of police personnel and their terms and conditions 
of employment were matters of purely municipal concern as 
-9-
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distinguished from general State-wide concern." Id. at 831. 
The Court, therefore, framed the issue for decision in Midwest 
City as follows: "Does the Act in question concern merely 
municipal matters?" Id. at 832. The Midwest City opinion 
provides an unequivocal answer to this question. 
The Legislature has determined that it is a 
matter of state-wide concern that the permanent 
members of any paid fire department ... be 
accorded the privilege of communicating with 
their respective employers with a collective 
voice. In our opinion, the privilege of 
communicating with their respective employers 
with a collective voice involves a matter of 
state-wide concern and the Act authorizing 
them to speak through a collective voice super-
sedes any charter provision to the contrary. 
Id. at 834. 
Likewise, in Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963), < 
the California Supreme Court upheld a firefighter/city 
collective bargaining statute against a constitutional 
challenge which was based on a constitutional provision < 
i 
identical to Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28. 
The basic question to be determined is whether or 
not the matters embraced by the Code sections are 
... exclusively municipal affairs .... In urging < 
that the matters embraced in the Code sections are \ 
of a purely local concern, both the trial Court and 
the defendant rely upon a number of authorities which, 
they contend, hold that all matters connected with 
public employment in a chartered city are municipal 
affairs [citations omitted]. None of these cases, 
nor any other similar cases, relied upon by defendant, { 
hold that all matters connected with public employment 
in a chartered city are exclusively municipal affairs 
in which the State has no concern. Each deals with a 
specific phase of City employment, and each holds that ^ 
the phase there under consideration is a municipal 
affair ... . Because the various sections of Article < 
XI fail to define municipal affairs, it becomes necessary 
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for the Courts to decide, under the facts of each 
case, whether the subject matter under discussion 
is of municipal or state-wide concern. This ques-
tion must be determined from the legislative purpose 
in each individual instance. In the instant case, 
it would appear that the Legislature was attempting 
to deal with labor relations on a state-wide basis 
... . Labor relations are of the same state-wide 
concern as workman's compensation ... . Id. at 
32 Cal. Rptr. 838-39, 384 P.2d 166-67. 
If firefighter/city collective bargaining is held 
to be a matter of State-wide concern, then it would seem 
that compulsory arbitration of collective bargaining disputes, 
an equally integral part of labor relations where vital 
public services such as fire protection are involved, is like-
wise a matter of State-wide concern. 
Thus, New York's firefighter/city compulsory 
arbitration law has been held to supersede what might 
otherwise be considered municipal prerogatives because: 
"The Legislature may act by general law in areas of general 
state concern, even though the enactment may touch upon the 
property, affairs, or government of municipalities and 
circumscribe local authority in that area." City of Corning v. 
Corning Police Department, 81 Misc. 2d 294, 299, 366 N.Y.S. 2d 
241, 246 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
Similar reasoning has been employed to constitu-
tionally validate Wyoming's firefighter/city compulsory 
arbitration law: 
... A city, as a creature of the Legislature, 
has only such powers as have been-granted to it 
by the State. Thus, the Legislature could 
authorize a city to employ and pay firemen, 
and it could place limitations upon the manner 
in which pay and working conditions shall be arrived Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at. Recognition of the principle of compulsory 
arbitration, when collective bargaining fails is 
quite common in business and industrial affairs. 
We have seen contracts between labor and manage-
ment wherein provisions for arbitration of unre-
solved disputes were contained. It has never 
been suggested that the carrying out of such 
arbitration is a performance of a "municipal 
function." Even though one of the parties in the 
arbitration ... is a city, the act of arbitration is 
no different from the act of arbitration in business 
and industrial affairs. It is nothing more than 
the performance of arbitration, and it cannot be 
said to be the performance of a municipal function. 
State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 746, I.A.F.F. 
v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968). 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Maine has found 
that: 
... our constitution gave the Legislature full 
responsibility over the subject matter of public 
schools and education and empowered it to make 
all reasonable laws in reference to schools and 
education for the "benefit of the people of this 
State." [citation omitted]. Except for the 
areas where the Legislature has from time to 
time seen fit to impose its own requirements ... 
the responsibilities for operating the public schools 
have'remained in the local school boards. The 
Legislature has now decided to take from the school 
boards the ultimate authority they have exercised 
in certain areas of school management — that is, 
as to "hours, and working conditions" and contract 
grievance arbitration — and to give it to ad hoc 
boards of arbitration ... there can be no doubt but 
that the Legislature, which is the source of all 
municipal authority [citation omitted], has also 
the power to take back from municipal officers 
portions of the authority it has earlier given them. 
City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 
304 A.2d 387, 397-98 (Me. 1973). 
A formidable line of authority concurs in the 
rationale adopted by the New York, Wyoming and Maine courts 
in upholding compulsory arbitration statutes similar to the 
Act involved in the present case against constitutional 
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challenges based on constitutional provisions identical 
or virtually identical to Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28. 
At least twenty-three states have enacted collective bar-
gaining and compulsory arbitration statutes to govern public 
employer/employee labor disputes (Alaska, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New York, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming). At present, ten State Supreme Court 
decisions have dealt with the constitutionality of either 
the collective bargaining or compulsory arbitration provisions 
of these statutes. All but one of these decisions (South 
Dakota) has upheld the constitutionality of these statutes.* 
*See Professional Firefighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 
32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963); City of Biddeford v. 
Biddeford Teachers Association, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Dearborn 
Fire Fighters Union, Local NoT 412, I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 
394 Mich. 239, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975); School District of 
Seward Education Association v. School District of Sew"ard, 
188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); City of Amsterdam v. 
Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975); Midwest City v. 
Cravens, 532 P. 2d 829 (Okl. 1975); Harney v. Russo, 4 35 PaT~ 
183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular 
Fireman's Association, 256 A.2d 206 TR"I I. 1969); State ex rel. 
Fire Fighters Local No. 746, I.A.F.F. v. City of Laramie, 437 
P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968); City of Buffalo v. New York State 
Public Employment Relations Board, 363 N.Y.S.2d 896 TSup• Ct. 
1975); City of Corning v. Corning Police Dept., 81 Misc. 2d 
294, 366 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1974); and City of Spokane 
v. Spokane Police Guild and Local No. 29 I.A.F.F., CCH Labor 
L. Rpt. State Laws Vol. 3 1! 53, 818 (Wash. Super. Ct. , April 
16, 1975). See also, Detroit Police Officers Association v. 
Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974); People v. Local 
365, Cemetery Workers, 33 N.Y.2d 582, 301 N.E.2d 434 (1973); 
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(5) Policy Reasons. Plaintiffs have complained 
repeatedly throughout the course of the present litigation 
that compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective 
bargaining disputes will eventuate in "taxation" of Salt 
Lake City residents "without representation." Although 
"compulsory taxation" of this sort seems rather improbable 
under the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act (the arbitration 
panel's decisions relative to salaries and wages are advisory 
only), nevertheless Plaintiffs' preoccupation with the interest 
of Salt Lake City taxpayers seems unjustifiably narrow. Plain-
tiffs' "taxation without representation" argument ignores 
other more substantial public interests in the maintenance 
of sound firefighter/city- labor relations. These other 
i 
interests, in turn, suggest that regulation of firefighter/
 | 
city labor relations is a matter of State-wide and not merely 
local concern. 
Mt. St. Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 
N.E.2d 508 (1970); and State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, 
I.A.F.F. v. Kingham, 420 P.2d 254 (Wyo. 1966). Cf. Luhrs v. 
City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1938); Fire Fighters 
Union, Local 1186, I.A.F.F. v. City of Vallejo, 116 Cal. Rptr. ^ 
507, 526 P.2d 971, 981 n. 13 (1974); Huff vTMayor and City < 
Council of Colorado Springs, 512 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1973); Board 
of Trustees of P. and F. R. F. v. City of Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 
515 (Ky. 1960); Rockland Professional Firefighters Association 
v. City of Rockland, 261 A.2d 418 (Me. 1970); Kentucky Municipal 
League v. Commonwealth Dept. of Labor, 530 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. Ct. ' 
App. 1975); and City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment I 
Relations Commission, 87 LRRM 2099 (Wise. Cir. Ct., June 21, 1974). 
See generally 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations § 133 (1971) 
and 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 592 (1949). But see, 
City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, | 
234 N.W.2d 35 (S. D. 1975). But cf. Erie Firefighters Local 
No. 29 3 v. Gardiner, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962). * 
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(a) It is entirely obvious, for instance, 
that the nature of firefighter/city labor relations will 
affect the quality of fire protection in Utah's municipali-
ties. See Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1938). 
Many people who live in or outside Utah visit or own property 
or businesses situated in Utah's municipalities. These 
people, businesses, and property have an interest in the 
quality of fire protection afforded by these municipalities; 
and this interest is certainly commensurate with whatever 
independent interest Salt Lake City's taxpayers have in the 
regulation and ordering of Utah's municipal fire departments. 
Moreover, this "public-at-large" interest has been expressly 
recognized in the Utah State Fire Prevention Law, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-29-1 et seq. (1953), the declared purpose of which 
is to provide for the adoption and enforcement of Uniform 
Codes for'prevention of, and protection from fire disaster 
and other hazards in the political subdivisions of this State. 
May the cities, then, tell the State, "We will unilaterally 
determine the fire protection needs of these people, businesses, 
and properties, and give them such protection as we think 
best?" Unless the answer to this question is "no"—the fraction 
of Utah's citizenry who are residents of plaintiff municipalities 
will dictate fire protection policy for the majority of Utah's 
residents. Thus Defendants suspect that Plaintiffs are not 
entirely sincere in their reliance on "taxation without 
representation" principles of majoritarian political democracy 
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as support for their anti-firefighter/city collective bargaining 
arguments. 
(b) A corollary argument in this regard is, 
of course, that State buildings, facilities, universities, 
and other State properties are dependent for their fire 
protection on municipal fire departments. 
(c) Likewise, many municipal fire departments 
service areas beyond municipal boundaries. In recognition 
of this fact, Utah Code Ann. § 11-7-1 (1953) specifically 
authorizes the interchange of fire protection responsibilities 
between Utahfs cities, counties, private corporations, fire 
districts, and federal governmental agencies. Thus it has 
been argued that the extraterritorial character of a municipal 
service constitutes the "point of delineation" between areas 
of State-wide and purely local concern. From this perspective, 
the decisive test for finding a municipal function "was whether 
the function dealt specifically with a problem within the 
corporate territorial limits and which affected the inhabitants 
thereof. When the community so handles the problem that it 
affects others beyond the corporate limits or the inhabitants 
of the state generally, the matter becomes a state affair." 
Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2—Cottonwood 
Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 192, 460 P.2d 814, 822 (1969) 
(J. Callister, dissenting opinion). 
(d) In addition to the extraterritorial 
nature of fire protection services—the State, as overseer 
of the State economy, has a continuing interest in the wage Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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scales, working hours, and working conditions of public 
and private employees. Cf. Burr v. Chi Ids, 265 P. 2d 383 
(Utah 1953); McCrew v, Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 
85 P.2d 608 (1938); and Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 8 P.2d 591 
(Utah 1932). 
(e) State regulation of firefighter/city 
labor relations is desirable for purposes of establishing 
uniformity. Allowing municipalities to deal independently 
with local fire departments will necessarily lead to a 
hodgepodge, uneven bestowal of bargaining rights. This 
situation would invite confusion; the feeling among fire-
fighters that they are being treated unfairly; and possibly 
even lawsuits grounded on equal protection claims. 
(f) Similarly, the State has an interest 
in guaranteeing State-wide, industrial peace; especially 
where the' distribution of essential public services is 
concerned. Industrial peace, however, can be obtained only 
at a certain price; viz. interposing balance in the public 
employer/employee collective bargaining process so that 
public employers can no longer unilaterally and arbitrarily 
impose standards relative to working hours and working 
conditions on public employees. 
The Legislature has apparently concluded ... that 
experience has taught that certain aspects of this 
dynamic and complicated municipal employer-employee 
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relationship no longer need remain subject 
to arbitrary decision by the employer, and that 
in the area of working conditions and hours and 
of contract grievances, the interests of the 
employees must in fairness be examined by 
impartial persons. The Legislature appears 
to believe that this much can be done without 
serious disruption of the balancing of operating 
costs against municipal appropriations ... 
we are of the opinion that the Legislature, 
mindful of the denial to municipal employees of 
such economic weapons as strikes and work stoppages 
which are available to employees in private 
employment, have sought to avoid the disruptive 
feelings of resentment and bitterness which may 
result if the governmental employee may look only 
to the government for redress of his grievances. 
City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Associa-
tion, 304 A.2d 387, 398 (Me. 1973). 
Many commentators have concurred in the Maine 
Supreme Court's judgment that compulsory arbitration is an 
effective and harmonious means of preventing the otherwise 
deleterious impact of strikes in the public sector. Among 
those commentators we find many of Utah's "founding fathers." > 
Many strikes may be averted in this way and 
there will be a large loss of life and property, 
and I think it can be very largely avoided, if 
we have a provision which will create a board 
of conciliation and arbitration ... 
i 
It was always a one-sided affair if we [employers] 
had any difficulty with our laboring men. They have * 
demanded certain hours and certain amount of wages 
per month, and if we did not like it, they say, 
"we will go out, we will quit." The consequence 
was we looked around for some other skilled labor < 
to take these gentlemen's places, if they would 
insist upon it. We found we could not obtain that •* 
kind of labor which is desirable for our business, 
therefore, we were handicapped and the consequences 
have been we have had to give in every time. We 
had no arbitration. It was merely a matter of a ( 
bulldozing arrangement, and therefore I hope the ^ 
striking out will not prevail, and such a matter as 
this is asked for [compulsory arbitration of labor 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disputes] will be put in our constitution. 
Official Report Of The Proceedings And 
Debates Of The Convention Assembled At 
Salt Lake City On The Fourth Day Of March 
1895, To Adopt A Constitution For The 
State Of Utah, Vol. II, 1033 and 1040 (1898). 
See also, Dayton Classroom Teachers Assn. v. Dayton Board 
of Education, 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E. 2d 714 (1975); 
City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild and Local No. 29 
I.A.F.F., CCH Labor L. Rpt. State Laws Vol. 3 11 53, 818 
(Wash. Super. Ct. , April 16, 1976); and McAvoy, "Binding 
Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the 
Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector;' 72 Col. L. Rev. 
1192 (1972). 
For the policy reasons outlined above, Defendants 
conclude that the collective bargaining and compulsory 
arbitration provisions of the Utah Firefighters Negotiations 
Act are matters of State-wide and not merely local concern 
and that said Act should be declared constitutional. 
(6) Case Law And Policy Reasons Cited By 
Plaintiffs In Support Of Their Assertion That The Act 
Violates Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28 Are Not Compelling. 
(a) Plaintiffst Case Law. It has already 
been established that firefighter/city labor relations are 
a matter of State-wide rather than purely municipal concern. 
This conclusion is further supported by a long line of Utah 
cases which have held that where a valid exercise of State 
police power is concerned, strict construction of Article VI 
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§ 28 is necessary to insure state sovereignty. In the absence 
of an express or clearly implied surrender to cities of the 
power in question, the State retains that power. See Ogden 
City v. Public Service Commission, 123 Utah 437, 260 P.2d 
751 (1953); Provo City v. Department of Business Regulation, 
118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d 675 (1950); Riggins v. District Court 
of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935); City of 
St. George v. Public Utilities Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220 
P. 720 (1923); and Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 
Utah 548, 134 P. 560 (1930). 
Cases relied upon by Plaintiffs in the lower court 
proceedings such as State Water Pollution Control Board v. 
Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370 (1957) , Backman 
v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962), 
and Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 
(1967) , aire not to the contrary. 
In State Water Pollution Control Board, this 
Court expressly confined its definition of Article VI § 28fs 
municipal function language to "such matters [as] are conducted 
in a manner which [does not] threaten pollution of water beyond 
the confines of the city." State Water Pollution Control 
Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 255, 311 P.2d 370, 
375 (1957). See also, Branch v. Salt Lake County Service 
Area No. 2—Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 192, 460 
P.2d 814, 122 (1969) (J. Callister, dissenting opinion). 
Moreover, the Court's broad reading of Article VI § 28's 
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municipal function language in State Water Pollution Control 
Board occurred during the Court's discussion of the proprietary 
v. governmental dichotomy relative to municipal immunity in 
tort actions and not in the context of the State v. municipal 
sovereignty issue which is the frame of reference for the 
present case. 
This Court has specifically noted that the Backman 
language relative to Article VI § 28 is dictum and, therefore, 
not controlling. See Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area 
No. 2—Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 186, 460 P.2d 814, 
817 (1969). Nevertheless, the Backman Court observed that 
cases legitimizing State intervention in local affairs are 
"obviously predicated on the assumption that because of the 
magnitude of the ... project, which could not have been 
accomplished by a single municipality, coupled with state-
wide concern and interest ... together with the fact that 
such act was not only general and uniform, calling for such 
promotion coterminus with any city or county, but available 
for many cities and counties, overlapping or noncontiguous, 
there was no special commission performing a municipal 
function." (Emphasis in original omitted.) Backman v. 
Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 419, 375 P.2d 756, 760-61 
(1962). 
Both State Water Pollution Control Board and 
Backman, therefore, reinforce Defendants' assertion here that 
the dictates of Article VI § 28 must give way to the 
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dictates of Article XI § 5 where the nature of firefighter/ 
city labor relations affects the public-at-large and the 
State generally. 
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 
449 (1967), has a similarly inconclusive bearing on the 
present case because: (1) Gord1s discussion of Article VI 
§ 28 is clearly dictum and (2) close examination of the 
Briefs filed in the Gord case reveals that this Court was 
not instructed on the constitutional interplay of Article 
VI § 28 and Article XI § 5. Therefore, the Court was not 
given an opportunity to consider all relevant Utah law in 
arriving at its decision in the Gord case. 
(3) More importantly, however, Plaintiffs are 
suggesting by their reliance on Gord that the entire 
functional area of municipal employer/employee labor 
relations should be designated as a "municipal concern." 
But even if we accept this "functional area" approach to 
the "municipal concern" problem, Gord has little relevance 
to the present case. First, it is obvious that appeal 
procedures for employee discharges involved in Gord and 
collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration procedures 
involved in the present case are functionally distinct 
processes. And second — whereas Gord dealt with the 
discharge of a city cemetery worker, we are dealing in the 
present case with firefighters — a distinct category of 
public employees who perform a distinctly State-oriented 
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public service. The very statute which the Gord opinion 
construed points up this distinction.* 
Moreover, in Tribe v. Salt Lake City, 540 P.2d 
499 (Utah 1975), this Court emphasized that "municipal 
concerns" were ascertained not through some "functional 
area" test, but rather by asking whether the activities in 
question were "more appropriately performed by a state 
agency." Id. at 503. Thus a more isolated subject such as 
the employee discharge for incompetence involved in Gord 
may more appropriately be handled by local authorities while 
firefighter/city labor relations problems which have broader 
State-wide dimensions are more-appropriately handled in 
accordance with State legislative policies. See Professional 
Firefighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 
384 P.2d 158 (1963). 
*The Gord opinion interpreted language from Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-2-5 (1953) which dealt with appeal procedures for 
certain classes of discharged municipal employees. Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-2-4 (1953) , however, makes it clear that the appeal 
mechanism provided under § 49-2-5 is not applicable to fire-
fighters: "All appointive officers and employees of cities 
of the first, second, and third class and incorporated towns, 
other than members of the police and fire departments and 
heads of departments, superintendents, shall hold their 
employment without limitation of time, being subject to 
discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided [in 
§49-2-5. (Emphasis supplied.) Firefighters are members of 
the classified civil service and are thus amenable only to 
the discharge procedures found at Utah Code Ann. § 10-10-21 
(1953)• Not only do firefighters constitute a distinct 
class of employees by virtue of their separate civil service 
classification, but also firefighters constitute a distinct 
class of employees by virtue of the essential nature of fire 
protection services which they render. 
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Cases cited from other jurisdictions and relied 
upon by Plaintiffs as authority for their Article VI § 28 
claim are equally inapposite. Plaintiffs, for instance, 
rely heavily on State v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1955). 
This case does not detract from Defendants1 arguments in 
the present case, but rather it supports those arguments. 
Plaintiffs have looked only superficially to the Washington 
Court's conclusion that the compulsory arbitration provision 
involved in that case was unconstitutional and have overlooked 
the Court's reason for arriving at that conclusions. In 
Johnson, the municipality involved had amended its own charter 
to provide for compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city 
collective bargaining disputes. Unlike the present situation 
in Utah, the State of Washington had not expressly conferred 
upon Washington municipalities the right to arbitrate as a 
means of firefighter/city impasse resolution. Employing 
i 
precisely the same line of argument which Defendants have
 { 
detailed in the foregoing provisions of this Brief, the 
Johnson Court: 
( 
... noted ... that the [city] charter
 { 
provision [providing for compulsory arbitration 
of firefighter/city collective bargaining 
disputes] itself must be "consistent with and 
subject to the constitution and laws of this 
State." ... Although the people ... are { 
granted the right to set up a charter to < 
rule themselves ... that charter cannot run 
counter to the constitution or laws of the 
State which gave them the right to enact it ... 
It has many times been held that charter , 
provisions of a city may be superseded by general 
laws of the Legislature ... Id. at 665. < 
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This language makes it clear that the Court 
struck down as unconstitutional the compulsory arbitration 
provision involved in Johnson not because resolution of 
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes was 
necessarily a "municipal affair" but because the State's 
statutory policy of making such resolution a municipal 
affair had been circumvented by the city's amendment to its 
charter in Johnson. Thus the Johnson decision underlines 
the supremacy of State policy-making powers with respect 
to firefighter/city labor relations. See especially the 
discussion of the Johnson case contained in State ex rel. 
St. Louis Fire Fighters Association, Local No. 73, AFL-CIO 
v. Stemmler, 479 S.W. 2d 456, 460 (Mo. 1972). 
This supremacy is further evidenced by a post-
Johnson Washington court opinion, City of Spokane v. Spokane 
Police Guild and Local No. 29 I.A.F.F., CCH Labor L. Rpt. 
State Laws Vol. 3 1[ 53, 818 (Wash. Super. Ct., April 16, 
1975) , wherein a State legislative enactment similar to 
Utah's Fire Fighters Negotiations Act was upheld against 
constitutional attack because: 
The premise that the public health, safety, 
and welfare is a matter of great concern 
to all of the citizens of the State of 
Washington is one of the principles the 
court felt compelled to consider along with 
the fact that the uniformed employees are 
giving up a bona fide, important right; 
that is, the right to strike and were 
receiving in place of this valuable right 
a binding arbitration procedure. 
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Plaintiffs place similarly heavy reliance on 
reasoning found in City of Springfield v, Clouse, 206 S.W. 
2d 539 (Mo. 1947). 
The Clouse opinion dealt with a city's power to 
enter into collective bargaining agreements with municipal 
employees and did not deal with the compulsory arbitration 
of collective bargaining disputes between cities and their 
employees. The Court ruled that cities in Missouri do not 
have power to enter into collective bargaining agreements 
with their employees because: (1) the setting of compen-
sation and working conditions for any public service involves 
the exercise of municipal legislative powers; (2) the city 
cannot delegate these municipal legislative powers; and (3) 
collective bargaining agreements between cities and their 
employees constitute a delegation of municipal legislative 
powers. The Court advances no reason whatsoever for its 
conclusory observation that collective bargaining agreements 
between cities and their employees constitute a delegation 
of municipal legislative powers. If this is the case, 
however, other kinds of municipal contracts would appear to 
be equally violative of the Court's delegation doctrine. 
Contracts for the construction of a city library or a city 
art center are contracts for a public service and, therefore, 
involve the exercise of municipal legislative power no less 
than contracts between cities and their employees. Would 
a court seriously entertain the highly impractical thought 
that municipalities are precluded from negotiating and entering Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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into such contracts because once a municipality is bound 
thereby it loses some sort of legislative discretion? 
Plaintiffs themselves would be reluctant to admit to such 
a far-reaching proposition. Defendants conclude, therefore, 
that the Clouse Court's leap of faith from step (2) to step 
(3) of the syllogism outlined above is totally unjustified. 
Moreover, as in the Johnson case, the Clouse 
Court's opinion was ultimately bottomed on the principle 
that the city involved there had no power to bargain collect-
ively because the State Legislature had not expressly 
granted the city such power: 
Missouri cities have or can exercise 
only such powers as are conferred by 
express or implied provisions of law; 
their charters being a grant and not 
a limitation of power, subject to 
strict construction, with doubtful 
powers resolved against the city. ... 
it seems obvious that, under the civil 
'service laws applicable to the city, it 
must deal with all of its employees, 
regardless of kind or classification 
on exactly the same basis and that is by 
the exercise of its legislative powers in 
accordance with the conditions fixed by 
the general assembly^ This clearly 
leaves the city no authority to deal with 
any employees involved herein on a 
collective bargaining contract basis. 
(Emphasis supplied.) City of Springfield 
v. Clouse, 206 S.W. 2d 539, 546-47 (Mo. 
1947). 
State policy-making supremacy in the area of firefighter/city 
labor relations is the underlying theme of the Court's decision. 
It is apparent that if State enabling legislation were passed 
in Missouri, providing for State usurpation of what had 
hitherto been State-granted municipal prerogatives relative 
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to firefighter/city labor relations, Missouri municipalities 
would have to accede to the new State legislative commands 
just as they were forced to accede to old State legislative 
commands in Clouse. 
(b) Plaintiffs' Policy Reasons, Plaintiffs 
devoted considerable time in the lower court proceedings 
describing the horrific consequences which allegedly would 
flow from compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collec-
tive bargaining disputes. Examples of budget-breaking 
arbitration awards in a dispute involving Oakland City and 
local firefighters there were drawn from newspaper and 
magazine accounts. 
Defendants cannot overstress the irrelevance of 
these arguments and examples. First, under Utah's Act, the 
arbitration board's decisions relative to wages and salaries 
are advisory only, whereas such decisions are binding 
under Oakland's charter provision governing the arbitra-
tion of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes. 
In any event, questions as to the nature and extent of i 
arbitrators' awards under Utah's Act are premature, specula-
tive, and remote. 
Second—contrary to Plaintiff municipalities1 1 
claim that compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city 
collective bargaining disputes would constitute a radical 
and unconscionable departure from the present division of i 
( 
State/city administrative responsibilities—it is apparent 
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that Plaintiff municipalities tolerate innumerable instances 
of State interference in what otherwise might be described 
as areas of municipal concern. 
For example, municipal legislative bodies cannot 
easily remove local civil service commissioners, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-10-12 (1953), and yet these commissioners 
are given final and binding power to decide questions 
involving the discharge of employees in the classified 
civil service, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-10-21 (1953). 
Similar examples of State legislation which establishes 
commissions with regulatory powers impinging on areas of 
municipal concern can be found'in the Utah Firemen's 
Retirement Act, Utah Code Ann. §§49-6a-l et seq. (Supp. 
1975); the State Workmen's Compensation Law, Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-43(1) (1953); the Utah Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1973, Utah Code Ann. §§ 39-9-3(5) and 
(8) (1953); and the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 34-35-2(2), (5), and (6) (1953); and compli-
ance with each of these laws entails considerable municipal 
expense. 
Public transit districts which are essentially 
subentities of Utah municipalities, Utah Code Ann* §§ 11-20-4 
to -7 (1953), must submit irresolvable labor disputes with 
their employees to arbitration under the Utah Public 
Transit District Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-20-32 (1953). 
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And finally, although no special commission is 
involved, Utah municipalities are required by State law 
to bear the administrative expense of a dues check-off 
procedure whenever requested by public employee union 
members, Utah Code Ann, § 34-32-1 (1953). See UTEA v. 
Brigham City, P-H Public Personnel Administration L-M 
Relations Vol. 4 No. 21.18, April 13, 1976 (Utah 1st 
Jud. Dist. Ct. Box Elder County, February 9, 1976). 
Judging by the realities of day-to-day municipal 
employer/employee labor relations, it becomes apparent that 
the State plays a dominant, intrusive role in governing 
those relations. These realities likewise make it clear 
that the "parade of horribles" argument advanced by Plain-
tiffs in the lower court proceedings is primarily the figment 
of Plaintiffs1 biased imagination. 
Third and most fundamentally—Plaintiffs1 "parade , 
of horribles" argument should not be considered by this ' 
Court in arriving at its decision in the present case 
because said argument deals with questions of policy more < 
appropriately handled by the legislative branch of our 
State government. The question before this Court in the 
present case is not—as the Oakland City experience implies— ( 
whether compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective 
bargaining disputes should be the law of this State or 
whether it will have a financially oppressive impact on < 
i 
Plaintiff municipalities. The question before this court 
is whether the State Legislature had the constitutional 
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power to pass the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act— 
regardless of any consequences, fortunate or unfortunate, 
which might accrue because of said Act's implementation. 
Defendants are confident that the State Legislature 
was possessed of such constitutional power when it enacted 
the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act, 
ARGUMENT II 
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND COMPULSORY ARBI-
TRATION PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS 
ACT ARE SEVERABLE. 
The Act's collective bargaining and compulsory 
arbitration provisions are severable for both functional 
and constitutional reasons. 
First, it should be obvious that collective 
bargaining and compulsory arbitration are functionally 
independent processes. It is possible to impose a duty to 
bargain collectively on the various parties to a labor 
dispute and at the same time provide both parties with 
remedies or with no remedies when one party refuses to 
bargain in good faith or when a bargaining impasse is 
reached. These remedies can be either express or implied 
and include, inter alia, strikes, work stoppages and slow 
downs, mediation, conciliation, voluntary and compulsory 
interest arbitration, voluntary and compulsory grievance 
arbitration, or court injunctions. These impasse resolution 
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procedures, however, are not necessary to the existence 
of collective bargaining* The Legislature could have 
intended that, in the absence of any impasse resolution 
procedure, parties to a particular labor dispute would 
remain deadlocked and fail to negotiate a contract, or that 
such parties should be left to find their own remedies 
through exertion of economic and legal pressures of their 
own and not the State's creation. 
Second—from a political and constitutional 
perspective—there is a qualitative difference between the 
impact and effect of collective bargaining and compulsory 
arbitration. Under a regime, of collective bargaining, 
the public employer retains ultimate power to approve or 
disapprove a proposed agreement, and the decision is, 
therefore, arguably a product in part of political influ-
ence. In the case of binding interest arbitration, however, 
public employers are forced to surrender this power into the 
hands of a neutral arbitration board—and to this extent 
traditional rules of political accountability may be 
weakened. 
Finally, a duty to bargain collectively does 
not require the interposition of a "special commission" 
under Article VI § 28—whereas compulsory arbitration may 
in the form of an arbitration board. 
For these reasons Defendants suggest that collec-
tive bargaining and compulsory arbitration are distinct 
and severable legal concepts and that it would therefore 
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be appropriate for the Court to reverse the lower court's 
order in the present case insofar as that order holds the 
collective bargaining provisions of the Utah Firefighters 
Negotiations Act unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendants 
respectfully submit that the lower court's judgment in the 
present case should be reversed as requested by Defendants 
on this appeal and that the Utah Firefighters Negotiations 
Act should be declared constitutional by this Court. 
DATED this j> 3 day of September, 19 76. 
jd. 
Jepry W. James 
IRVINE, SMITH & MABEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
225 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-4111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of 
the foregoing was mailed on the day of September, 
1976, to: Roger F. Cutler, Attorney for Plaintiffs Salt 
Lake City, Evan Baker, and Harold Newman, 101 City and County 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Glen J. Ellis, Attorney 
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for Plaintiff Provo City, Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84601; Jack A. 
Richards, Attorney for Plaintiff Ogden City, P. 0. Box 9699, Ogden, 
Utah 84409; Merrill G. Hansen, Attorney for Plaintiff Murray 
City, 5461 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107; and J. Blaine 
Zollinger, Attorney for Plaintiff Logan City, 61 West First North, 
Logan, Utah 84321. 
f c 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
